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Peace treaty between Byzantium and Arabs, 782

Συγγραφή : Makripoulias Christos (12/3/2002)
Μετάφραση : Velentzas Georgios

Για παραπομπή: Makripoulias Christos, "Peace treaty between Byzantium and Arabs, 782",
Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Μείζονος Ελληνισμού, Μ. Ασία
URL: <http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=10350>
Συνθήκη Ειρήνης Βυζαντίου και Αράβων, 782 (20/3/2008 v.1) Peace treaty between Byzantium and Arabs, 782 (21/2/2006 v.1) 
 

1. Historical Framework

In 778, during the constant armed conflicts between Byzantines and Arabs, the Byzantines invaded the Arabic lands of Mesopotamia and northern Syria and besieged Germanikeia. Although they did not manage to capture the city, they arrested a part of the population of the nearby areas and defeated an Arab force that had come to help the city. The Arab prestige was damaged after the defeat and caliph al-Mahdi launched heavy raids against the Byzantine territories of Asia Minor in 779 and 781. The raids did not produce any impressive results and al-Mahdi started to prepare a big expeditionary corps aiming to avenge the recent Arab failures. On February 9, 782 a powerful Arab army invaded Asia Minor under Harun ar-Rashid, the son and successor of the caliph. Τhe main body of the invaders reached Bithynia, where they fought against the troops of the Opsikion Theme. The Byzantines had to retreat to Nicomedia, while Harun ar-Rashid advanced to Chrysopolis and plundered the area. Despite the Byzantine retreat, the Arabs were in a difficult position because their escape was blocked by the tagmata under the domestikos ton scholon, Antonios, and the troops of the Boukellarion Theme. The solution to the Arab problem was provided by Tatzates, the Armenian strategosof the theme of Boukellarion. Due to his dispute with the new ruler Empress Eirene (780-802),1 he contacted Harun and asked for his help in order to return to Armenia with his family. In return, Tatzates suggested that Harun allure into discussions Antonios,magistros Petros and Staurakios, counselor of the empress and general commander of Asia Minor forces, and to capture them. The Arab leader used the hostages as a means of pressure and forced Eirene to sign a peace treaty in order to free her three high ranking officials.

2. Presentation and Analysis of the Event

In September 782, the delegates of Empress Eirene signed a peace treaty with the Arab caliph al-Mahdi.2 According to the terms of the treaty, the Byzantine Empire had to pay the Arabs an annual amount of 90,000 golden coins every April and 70,000 golden coins every June.3 Apart from paying an annual tax to maintain peace, the Byzantines should also immediately give guides and supplies to the Arab expeditionary corps under the command of Harun ar-Rashid, which was marooned in Bithynia at that moment. In addition, they had to allow Tatzates to leave the Empire and take his family and property with him. In exchange, the Arabs had to withdraw from Asia Minor and remove the troops they had in Bithynia and Nakoleia, which was under siege,4 and also free the domestikos ton scholonAntonios, the magistros Petros and Staurakios. The latter was the most important counselor of Eirene, who was deeply concerned about him. The Arabs also liberated 5000 captives, whom they had captured during their campaign. In addition, they were bound to stop their raids against the Byzantine territories of Asia Minor as long as they were paid in time. The peace treaty that made the Byzantines feel humiliated5 lasted until the spring of 785, when it was suspended on the initiative of Eirene, who refused to pay the 90,000 golden coins that should be given to the Arabs in April. Eirene probably believed that she could successfully confront the Arabs in the battlefield, while the termination of the humiliating treaty could help her in the interior of the empire and increase her prestige. It seems that the only reason why the empress had signed the treaty was because she wanted to save her three officials and particularly Staurakios.

3. Consequences

The terms Eirene had to agree on due to the circumstances were not favourable for Byzantium. More specifically, the payment of an annual tax to the Arabs was very humiliating and spoiled the prestige of the empress at the very moment she aimed to consolidate her politically insecure position and deal with her internal enemies.6 Moreover, the Byzantines lost a considerable amount of money because of the treaty, as they had to pay every year one tenth of their income to the Arabs. Nevertheless, the treaty with the Arabs safeguarded a period of three peaceful years along the Arabo-Byzantine borders of Asia Minor, with favourable terms for local populations, who were relieved from Arab destructions and pillages. Empress Eirene tried to take advantage of this ceasefire in order to consolidate her position and promote her external policy, which included expansion and stability in the various fronts. In the Balkans Staurakios led his forces the following year and subordinated the Slavs of mainland Greece.

1. According to Tritle, L.A., “Tatzates' Flight and the Byzantine-Arab Peace Treaty of 782”, Byzantion 47 (1977), pp. 296-300, what the sources present as hatred between Tatzates and Staurakios had deeper causes. The Armenian strategos had been appointed by Emperor Constantine V (741-775), while Staurakios was the main counselor of Empress Eirene. The influence of Constantine’s former partners on political matters decreased considerably when Eirene ascended the throne and, as a result, their relations with the new regime and its members were difficult. Tatzates possibly believed that the empress was going to replace him and preferred to act first.

2. Dölger, F., Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches, 1 (Munich-Berlin 1924), p. 340, wrongly dates the peace treaty to 781.

3. According to Lilie, R.-J., Byzanz unter Eirene und Konstantin VI. (780-802), series Berliner Byzantinische Studien 2 (Frankfurt am Main 1996), p. 152, the amount the Byzantines had to pay was 70,000 golden coins.

4. Treadgold, W.T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford, California 1988), p. 69, dates the end of the campaign to August 782 rather than September, when he considers the treaty was signed. However, the Byzantine territories must have been evacuated after the treaty was signed, since it included the retreat of the Arabs.

5. The humiliating terms of the treaty, which made the Byzantines pay huge amounts to the Arabs as tribute, although they had initially been in an advantageous position, is also confirmed by Treadgold, W.T., The Byzantine Revival 780-842 (Stanford, California 1988), pp. 70, 78, and Tritle, L.A., “Tatzates' Flight and the Byzantine-Arab Peace Treaty of 782”, Byzantion 47 (1977), p. 279.

6. Eirene was in a difficult position because she did not have absolute control on her underage son Constantine VI and was his guardian only in theory. At the same time, several people of her environment belonged to the former regime of Constantine V and were loyal iconoclasts, unlike Eirene, who wanted to restore icons.
     
 
 
 
 
 

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